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Adaptive decisionmaking in real-world contexts often
relies on strategic simplifications of decision prob-
lems. Yet, the neural mechanisms that shape these
strategies and their implementation remain largely
unknown. Using an economic decision-making task,
we dissociate brain regions that predict specific
choices fromthosepredictingan individual’spreferred
strategy. Choices that maximized gains or minimized
losses were predicted by functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging activation in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex or anterior insula, respectively. However,
choices that followed a simplifying strategy (i.e.,
attending to overall probability of winning) were asso-
ciated with activation in parietal and lateral prefrontal
cortices. Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, through
differential functional connectivity with parietal and
insular cortex, predicted individual variability in stra-
tegic preferences. Finally, we demonstrate that robust
decision strategies follow from neural sensitivity to
rewards. We conclude that decision making reflects
more than compensatory interaction of choice-related
regions; in addition, specific brain systems potentiate
choices depending on strategies, traits, and context.
INTRODUCTION
The neuroscience of decision making under risk has focused on
identifying brain systems that shape behavior toward or against
particular choices (Hsu et al., 2005; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Platt and Huettel, 2008). These studies typically involve compen-
satory paradigms that trade two decision variables against each
other, as when individuals choose between a safer, lower-value
option and a riskier, higher-value option (Coricelli et al., 2005; De
Martino et al., 2006; Huettel, 2006; Tom et al., 2007). Activation in
distinct regions reliably predicts the choices that are made:
increased activation in the anterior insula follows risk-averse
choices (Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008) and
increased activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and striatum predicts risk-seeking choices (Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005; Tobler et al., 2007). In contrast, prefrontaland parietal control regions support executive control processes
associated with risky decisions, as well as the evaluation of risk
and judgments about probability and value (Barraclough et al.,
2004; Huettel et al., 2005; Paulus et al., 2001; Sanfey et al.,
2003). These and other studies have led to a choice-centric
neural conception of decision making: tradeoffs between deci-
sion variables, such as whether someone seeks to minimize
potential losses ormaximize potential gains, reflect similar trade-
offs between the activation of brain regions (Kuhnen and Knut-
son, 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003). Accord-
ingly, individual differences in decision making have been
characterized neurometrically by estimating parameters associ-
ated with a single model of risky choice and identifying regions
that correlate with individual differences in those parameters
(De Martino et al., 2006; Huettel et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007).
Yet, following a purely compensatory approach to decision
making would require substantial computational resources,
especially for complex decision problems that involve multiple
decision variables. It has become increasingly apparent that
people employ a variety of strategies to simplify the representa-
tions of decision problems and reduce computational demands
(Camerer, 2003; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman
and Frederick, 2002; Payne et al., 1992, 1988; Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1974). For example, when faced with a complex decision
scenario that could result in a range of positive or negativemone-
tary outcomes, some individuals adopt a simplifying strategy that
deemphasizes the relativemagnitudesof theoutcomesbutmaxi-
mizes the overall probability ofwinning. Other individuals empha-
size the minimization of potential losses or the maximization of
potential gains in ways consistent with more compensatory
models of risky choice such as expected utility maximization
(Payne, 2005). Adaptive decision making in real-world settings
typically involves multiple strategies that may be adopted based
on the context and computational demands of the task (Giger-
enzer and Goldstein, 1996; Payne et al., 1993). As noted above,
there has been considerable research on identifying brain
systems that shapebehavior towardor against particular choices
(risky or safer gambles); however, much less is known about the
neural mechanisms that underlie inter- and intraindividual vari-
ability in decision strategies. We sought to address this limitation
in the present study by dissociating choice-related and strategy-
related neural contributors to decision making.
Weusedan incentive-compatibledecision-making task (Payne,
2005) that contained economic gambles with five rank-orderedNeuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 593
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gains (Figure 1). There were three types of choices: gain maxi-
mizing (Gmax), loss minimizing (Lmin), or probability maximizing
(Pmax). Making a Gmax choice increased the magnitude of the
largest monetary gain (i.e., the most money that could be won),
whereas making a Lmin choice reduced the magnitude of the
largest monetary loss (i.e., the most money that could be lost).
The gambles were constructed so that these two choices (Gmax
and Lmin) were generally consistent with a compensatory strategy
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for a discussion of
model predictions), such as following expected utility theory
and/or rank-dependent expectationmodels like cumulative pros-
pect theory (Birnbaum, 2008; Payne, 2005; Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992). On the other hand, making a Pmax choice increases
the overall probability of winning money compared to losing
money.Therefore,suchchoiceswouldbeconsistentwithasimpli-
fying strategy (e.g., ‘‘maximize the chance of winning’’) that
ignores rewardmagnitude. Finally, wecharacterized our subjects’
strategic preferences according to their relative proportion of
simplifying (Pmax) versus compensatory (Gmax and Lmin) choices.
Such a definition positions the two strategies as the end points
of a continuum with a high value indicating an individual’s prefer-
ence for a simplifying strategy and a low value indicating a prefer-
ence for a compensatory strategy.We emphasize that, as defined
operationally here, strategies for decision making may be either
explicit or implicit.
To distinguish neural mechanisms underlying choices from
those underlying the strategies that generate those choices,
Figure 1. Experimental Task and Behavioral Results
(A) Subjects were first shown, for 4–6 s, a multiattribute mixed gamble consist-
ing of five potential outcomes, each associated with a probability of occur-
rence. Then, two alternatives for improving the gambles were highlighted in
red, whereupon subjects had 6 s to decide which improvement they preferred.
Finally, after two arrows identified the buttons corresponding to the choices,
subjects indicated their choice by pressing the corresponding button as
soon as possible. Here, the addition of $20 to the central, reference outcome
would maximize the overall probability of winning (Pmax choice), whereas the
addition of $20 to the extreme loss would reflect a Lmin choice. The next trial
appeared after a variable interval of 4, 6, or 8 s. In other trials, subjects could
have a chance to add money to the extreme gain outcome, reflecting a Gmax
choice.594 Neuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.we collected several forms of behavioral and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) data. Consistent with many previous
studies (De Martino et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003), we charac-
terized brain regions as choice related if the magnitude of their
activation predicted a specific behavior (e.g., selecting the
option providing the largest gain) throughout our subject sample.
In contrast, we characterized brain regions as strategy related
based on their association with individual difference measures;
i.e., if the magnitude of their activation depended on whether
or not an individual engages in their preferred strategy, regard-
less of which of the choices that entails. Moreover, strategy-
related regions should exert a modulatory influence on choice-
related regions. A strong candidate for a strategy-related region
is the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which has been
shown to play an important role in tasks involving decision
conflict, as well as in making decisions that run counter to
general behavioral tendencies (De Martino et al., 2006; Pochon
et al., 2008). Moreover, this region exhibits distinct patterns of
functional connectivity to affective and cognitive networks (Mer-
iau et al., 2006), making it a candidate for shaping activation in
those networks based on context and computational demands
(Behrens et al., 2007; Kennerley et al., 2006).
Using large-sample behavioral experiments, we first demon-
strate systematic individual variability in decision making, with
a significant bias toward choices that maximize the overall prob-
ability of winning (i.e., toward a simplifying strategy). Then, using
fMRI, we show that distinct neural systems underlie choices
made on each trial and variability in strategic preferences across
individuals. Finally, we also demonstrate a striking relation
between neural sensitivity to monetary outcomes and individual
differences in strategic preferences, indicating that robust deci-
sion strategies may follow from the neural response to rewards.
These results demonstrate that decision making under uncer-
tainty does not merely reflect competition between brain regions
predicting distinct decision variables; in addition, the relation
between neural activation and subsequent decisions is medi-
ated by underlying strategic tendency.
RESULTS
Weconducted two behavioral experiments (n1 = 128 and n2 = 71)
and one fMRI experiment (n = 23), all involving the basic para-
digm illustrated in Figure 1. Subjects were young adult volun-
teers from the Duke University community (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for details on the experiments).
Research was conducted under protocols approved by the Insti-
tutional Review Boards of Duke University and Duke University
Medical Center.
Across both behavioral experiments (details available in
Supplemental Experimental Procedures), we found a significant
bias toward the Pmax choices (Figure S1 available online), ex-
tending prior findings in the behavioral literature (Payne, 2005).
In addition to demonstrating the robustness of the preferences
toward the Pmax choices, the second experiment also indicates
that this bias can be reversed or accentuated by experimental
manipulations. The findings from these studies are also consis-
tent with Pmax choice representing a simplifying strategy (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Finally, importantly
Neuron
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interindividual variability: some subjects nearly always preferred
a simplifying strategy (choosing the Pmax option in most trials);
others nearly always preferred a compensatory strategy
(choosing theGmax or Lmin options inmost trials), while still others
switched strategies on different trials resulting in both intra- and
intersubject variability in strategy (Figure S2).
Variability in Underlying Neural Mechanisms
We used high-field (4T) fMRI to evaluate the neural systems
associated with strategic decision making under uncertainty.
We adapted the basic design from our behavioral experiments
to the fMRI setting. Subjects first made a series of choices
without feedback. On each trial, subjects initially viewed the
decision options and then learned the assignment of choices
to responses, to eliminate any potential confounding effects of
response selection (Pochon et al., 2008). Then, following the
completion of all decision trials, we resolved a set of those trials
for real monetary rewards. This allowed us to measure reward-
related activation without altering subsequent decisions through
learning.
Consistent with our two behavioral experiments, fMRI subjects
made Pmax choices on approximately 70% of the trials when the
choiceswerematched for expected value.Moreover, thepropor-
tion of Pmax choices was systematically modulated by the trade-
off in expected value between the choices, indicating that
subjects were not simply insensitive to expected value (Table
S1). We evaluated intrasubject choice consistency using split-
sample analysis. We split each subject’s choices into samples
from odd-numbered runs and from even-numbered runs. There
was a strong correlation between the proportion of Pmax choices
in each sample (r=0.61; p < 0.01), evenwithout considering other
factors like relative expected value. For comparison, we used
a similar split-sample approach to estimate subject-specific
Figure 2. Distinct Sets of Brain Regions
Predict Choices
(A) Increased activation in the right anterior insula
(peak MNI space coordinates: x = 38, y = 28, z = 0)
and in the vmPFC (x = 16, y = 21, z = 23) pre-
dicted Lmin and Gmax choices, respectively, while
increased activation in the lateral prefrontal cortex
(x = 44, y = 44, z = 27) and PPC (x = 20, y =76, z =
57) predicted Pmax choices. Activation maps show
active clusters that surpassed a threshold of z >
2.3 with cluster-based Gaussian random field
correction.
(B–D) Percent signal change in these three regions
to each type of choice. Error bars represent ± 1
standard error of the mean for each column.
parameters for canonical expected utility
and cumulative prospect theory models
of decision making (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). We found
that model parameters estimated from
one half of the experimental data did not
significantly classify choices within the
other runs (Figure S3). Finally, the propor-
tion of Pmax choices decreased with increasing self-reported
tendency to maximize (r = 0.67, p < 0.001; Figure S4).
Neural Predictors of Choices
Our initial analyses identified brain regions whose activation was
driven, across subjects and trials, by the selected choice. There
wasgreater activation in anterior insular cortex (aINS) and vmPFC
(Figure 2A) for the compensatory magnitude-sensitive choices
(combined across Gmax and Lmin). These regions are typically
associatedwith emotional function,particularly theaffectiveeval-
uation of the outcome of a choice in decision-making tasks
(Bechara et al., 2000; Dalgleish, 2004; Paulus et al., 2003; Sanfey
et al., 2003).Wesubsequently performeda regionof interest (ROI)
analysis to explore specifically the differences in activation
between Gmax and Lmin. Note that this analysis was restricted,
a priori, to a subset of 15 subjects with a sufficient number of
choices in each condition of interest. We found a clear double
dissociationbetweenaINSand vmPFC:Gmax choiceswere asso-
ciated with greater activation within vmPFC, whereas Lmin
choices were associated with increased activation in aINS
(Figures 2B and 2C). Conversely, Pmax choices resulted in
increased activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)
and posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Figure 2A and Table S2),
regions typically associated with executive function and decision
making under risk and uncertainty (Bunge et al., 2002; Huettel
et al., 2005, 2006; Paulus et al., 2001). These regions showed
greater activation for Pmax choices compared to both Gmax and
Lmin, but nodifferencebetweenGmax andLmin options (Figure2D).
Neural Predictors of Strategic Variability
across Individuals
We next investigated whether there were brain regions whose
activation varied systematically with individual differences in
strategic preferences. To do this, we entered each subject’sNeuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 595
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subjects fMRI analyses of the contrast between choices. Stra-
tegic variability predicted individual differences in activation in
two clusters (Figures 3A and 3B): the dmPFC and the right infe-
rior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Within these regions, there was no signif-
icant difference in activation between the choices. However,
there was a significant interaction: activation increased when
an individual with preference for the more compensatory
strategy made a simplifying Pmax choice and vice versa. We
focus on the dmPFC in the rest of this manuscript, based on
our prior hypothesis about the role of this region as well as the
fact that only this region significantly predicted trial-by-trial
choices (as discussed later).
We next evaluated whether dmPFC activation might shape
activation in those regions that predicted specific choices (i.e.,
Pmax: dlPFC and PPC; Lmin: aINS; Gmax: vmPFC), using seed-
voxel-based whole-brain functional connectivity analyses. This
would provide additional converging evidence for the role of this
region in determining choice behavior, contingent on preferred
strategies. We found a double dissociation in the functional
connectivity of dmPFC depending on the choice made by the
subject (Figures 3C and 3D). When subjects made Pmax choices,
connectivity with dmPFC increased in dlPFC and PPC, whereas
when subjects made more magnitude-sensitive compensatory
Figure 3. dmPFC Predicts Strategy Use
during Decision Making
(A and B) Activation in dmPFC (x = 10, y = 22, z =
45; indicated with arrow) and the rIFG exhibited
a significant decision-by-trait interaction, such
that the difference in activation between compen-
satory and simplifying choices was significantly
correlated with preference for simplifying strategy
(mean-subtracted) across individuals.
(C and D) Functional connectivity of dmPFC varied
as a function of strategy: there was increased
connectivity with dlPFC (and PPC) for simplifying
choices and increased connectivity with aINS
(and amygdala) for compensatory choices. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean for
each column.
choices, connectivity increased in the
aINS (and amygdala, but not in vmPFC).
Moreover, the relative strength of the
connectivity between dmPFC and these
regions was significantly associated with
individual differences in strategy prefer-
ences across subjects (Figure S5). Finally,
we also conducted additional analyses to
rule out the possibility that dmPFC activa-
tion was related to response conflict, as
hasbeen found in several previousstudies
(Botvinick et al., 1999; Kerns et al., 2004;
details can be found in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
Thus, we provide a broad range of
converging results, drawn from overall
activation, functional connectivity, factor
analysis of behavioral data (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures), association with individual differences in strategy,
and trial-by-trial analysis (below), that together indicate that
dmPFC supports strategic considerations during decision mak-
ing by shaping behavior toward or against individual strategic
preferences.
Integrating Choices and Strategies to Predict Behavior
We used the brain regions implicated above as choice related
(aINS, vmPFC, dlPFC, and PPC) or strategy related (rIFG and
dmPFC) to predict choices on individual trials. We extracted,
for every trial for every subject, the activation amplitude in
each of these ROIs, along with the decision made on that trial.
We used a hierarchical logistic regression approach to evaluate
which of these regions were significant and independent predic-
tors of trial-to-trial decisions (Table 1).
We first entered into the model subjects’ overall preference for
the simplifying strategy (proportion of Pmax choices). We found,
unsurprisingly, that this was a highly significant predictor of
trial-to-trial choices. Next, we used activation values from our
brain ROIs, considering them both in isolation and with strategic
preference already entered into themodel. We found that activa-
tion in insular cortex was a significant predictor of magnitude-
sensitive choices, while parietal activation was a significant596 Neuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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Model Variables Coefficient (SE) Wald (Significance) Model Significance (c2) Model Fit (Nagelkerke R2)
Trait 76.09 0.069
Constant 0.14 (0.05) 6.19 (0.13)
Proportion of Pmax choices 1.02 (.12) 70.79 (0.000)
Brain 18.05 0.017
Constant 0.21 (0.06) 13.10 (0.000)
Right PPC 32.41 (8.43) 14.80 (0.000)
Right anterior insula 40.52 (13.28) 9.31 (0.002)
Trait (+ Brain) 90.26 0.081
Constant 0.22 (0.06) 13.38 (0.000)
Proportion of Pmax choices 1.00 (0.12) 67.23 (0.000)
Right PPC 30.54 (8.62) 12.56 (0.000)
Right anterior insula 33.32 (13.69) 5.93 (.012)
Trait + Brain + (Trait*Brain) 97.66 0.088
Constant 0.23 (0.06) 13.78 (.000)
Proportion of Pmax choices 1.10 (0.13) 71.75 (.000)
Right PPC 31.96 (8.70) 13.49 (.000)
Right anterior insula 33.00 (13.77) 5.74 (.017)
dMPFC * strategic variability 70.58 (26.28) 7.21 (.007)
All c2 values were highly significant (p < 104). We used stepwise logistic regression to evaluate the contributions of trait effects (i.e., overall proportion
of choices) and brain effects (i.e., activation of a given region on a given trial) to the specific choices (coded as a binary variable of Pmax choice) made by
subjects. As expected, subjects’ overall preference for simplifying strategy was a good predictor of Pmax choices on individual trials. An independent
logistic regression analysis revealed that two brain regions, the PPC and anterior insula, were significant positive and negative predictors of Pmax
choices and that these regions remained significant predictors even when the behavioral data were included in the model. Note that the dmPFC
activation, when not weighted by strategy, did not significantly improve the model fit at any stage. However, when weighted by strategy, the resulting
brain * strategy variable was a highly significant predictor of choices, even when the strategy itself was already included in the model. Regions not
indicated in this table were not significant predictors of choice behavior.predictor of Pmax choices. Critically, activation in these brain
regions improved the fit of the model even when the behavioral
data had already been included. None of the other regions,
including dmPFC, predicted either type of choice. Yet, when
we weighted dmPFC activation with each subject’s strategy
preference, the resulting variable became a significant and
robust predictor of behavior and overall model error was
reduced (Table 1). Thus, dmPFC activation does not predict
either type of choice, but instead predicts choices that are incon-
sistent with one’s preferred decision strategy.
We emphasize that the brain-behavior relations reported here
were highly significant even though the behavioral choice data
across trials for each subject (an indicator of behavioral strategy)
were already included in the logistic regression model. That is,
we could use the fMRI activation evoked within key brain regions
to improve our predictions of subjects’ decisions on individual
trials over what was predicted from behavioral data alone.
Neural Reward Sensitivity Predicts Individual
Differences in Strategy
Finally, we evaluated whether an independent neural measure of
reward sensitivity could predict the strategic preferences out-
lined in the previous sections. At the end of the scanning session,
each subject passively viewed a subset of their improved
gambles, which were each resolved to an actual monetary gain
or loss. While subjects were anticipating the outcome of eachgamble, there was increased activation in the ventral striatum
(vSTR), a brain region commonly implicated in learning about
positive and negative rewards (Schultz et al., 1997; Seymour
et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2006). Then, when the gamble
was resolved, vSTR activation increased to gains but decreased
to losses (Figures 4A and 4B). Moreover, there were striking and
significant correlations between strategic variability and vSTR
activation: those individuals who showed the greatest vSTR
increases to gains and decreases to losses both preferred the
simplifying Pmax strategy (Figure 4C) and scored low on a behav-
ioral measure of maximizing (Figure S6). These results suggest
that the use of a simplifying strategy that improves one’s overall
chances of winning (Pmax) may result from increased neural
sensitivity to reward outcomes.
DISCUSSION
When facing complex decision situations, many individuals
engage in simplifying strategies, such as choosing based on
the overall probability of a positive outcome, to reduce computa-
tional demands compared to compensatory strategies. Here, we
demonstrated two neural predictors of strategic variability in
decision making. First, during the decision process, the dmPFC
shapes choices (in a manner depending on strategic tendency)
through changes in functional connectivity with insular and
prefrontal cortices. Second, independent neurometric responsesNeuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 597
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At the end of the experiment, some gambles were resolved to monetary gains or losses.
(A and B) Activation in the vSTR (x = 14, y = 16, z = 10) increased when subjects were waiting for gambles to be resolved (anticipation) and, after resolution,
increased to gains but decreased to losses. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean for each column.
(C) Notably, the difference between gain-related and loss-related activation in the vSTR correlated with variability in strategic preferences across subjects, with
subjects who were most likely to prefer the Pmax exhibiting the greatest neural sensitivity to rewards.to rewards predicted strategic preferences: those individuals
with the greatest striatal sensitivity to reward valence are most
likely to use a simplifying strategy that emphasizes valence, but
ignores magnitude. These results provide clear and converging
evidence that the neural mechanisms of choice reflect more
than competition between decision variables; they additionally
involve strategic influences that vary across trials and individuals.
A large literature suggests that decisions between simple
gambles can be predicted by compensatory models like ex-
pected utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Fennema and
Wakker, 1997; Huettel et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Wu
et al., 2004). Individual differences in sensitivity to the parame-
ters within these models lead to distinct patterns of choices,
even when the same model is applied to all individuals (Huettel
et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007). As decision problems become
more complex, however, the assumption of a single canonical
decision strategy becomesmore andmore problematic. As sug-
gested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Payne et al. (1993),
people employ a variety of strategies to represent decision prob-
lems and evaluate options. Some of those strategies will be
consistent with traditional models like expected utility maximiza-
tion, whereas other strategies will be more heuristic or simpli-
fying. Further, depending on the decision context, people shift
among multiple strategies to maintain a balance between mini-
mizing cognitive effort or maximizing decision accuracy, among
other goals (Payne et al., 1993). Finally, strategy use to solve the
same decision problem differs across individuals, perhaps re-
flecting trait differences such as a tendency toward satisficing
versus maximizing. Our findings, from both behavioral and neu-
roimaging experiments, provide evidence in favor of intra- and
intersubject variability in the use of strategies across partici-
pants. Importantly, we show that the parameters estimated
using traditional economic models of risky choice were poor
predictors of choices in our paradigm, providing possible
evidence for differences in decision strategy within and across
participants.
One influential conjecture in decision making is that people
frequently use a variety of simplifying heuristics that reduce effort598 Neuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.associated with the decision process (Shah and Oppenheimer,
2008; Simon, 1957). Pmax choices in the current task are consis-
tent with such an effort-reduction framework, given that they
were associated with faster response times in the behavioral
experiments (note that we do not have accurate estimates of
response times in the imaging experiment as we sought to
explicitly separate the decision and response phases in our
design) and that the proportion of Pmax choices decreased adap-
tively with increasing cost in terms of expected value in all exper-
iments. We suggest, therefore, that strategic preferences in the
current task reflect tradeoffs, resolved differently by individual
subjects and over trials, between one strategy that simplifies
a complex decision problem by using a simple heuristic of maxi-
mizing the chances of winning (Pmax) and another, more
compensatory strategy that involves consideration of additional
information as well as the emotions associated with extreme
gains (Gmax) or losses (Lmin).
To the extent that the Pmax choices reflect a more simplifying
strategy, the pattern of activations seen in this study seems
counterintuitive: the regions conventionally associated with
automatic and affective processing (aINS and vmPFC) predicted
magnitude-sensitive choices that were more consistent with
traditional economic models such as expected utility maximiza-
tion, whereas the regions conventionally associated with execu-
tive functions (dlPFC and PPC) predicted choices more consis-
tent with a simplifying strategy. The lateral prefrontal cortex
has been shown in previous studies to be active during probabi-
listic decision making (Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006) as well as
sensitive to individual differences in the processing of probability
(Tobler et al., 2008). Neurons within this region have also been
shown to track reward probabilities (Kobayashi et al., 2002)
and process reward and action in stochastic situations (Barra-
clough et al., 2004). Similarly, the parietal cortex also plays an
important role in tracking outcome probabilities (Dorris and
Glimcher, 2004; Huettel et al., 2005). Given that Pmax choices
are based on the overall probability of winning, activation in
dlPFC and PPC could be associated with tracking subjective
probabilities in these gambles.
Neuron
Strategies and Choices in Risky Decision MakingConversely, theGmax and Lmin choices increase the chances of
an aversive outcome, relative to a neutral aspiration level (Lopes
andOden, 1999). Supporting this interpretation, we found a clear
double dissociation with activation in vmPFC predicting Gmax
choices and activation in aINS predicting Lmin choices. The
contributions of vmPFC to gain-seeking behavior (at the expense
of potential losses) have been documented in both patient
(Bechara et al., 2000) and neuroimaging studies (Tobler et al.,
2007). Conversely, there has been substantial recent work
demonstrating the importance of aINS for aversion to negative
consequences, even to the point of making risk-averse mistakes
in economic decisions (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Paulus et al.,
2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Rolls et al., 2008). Together, these
findings suggest that the conventional notion that decisions
reflect compensatory balancing of decision variables is an over-
simplification. In addition, different brain regions bias how
people approach decision problems, which may in turn lead to
one form of behavior or another depending on the task context.
Furthermore, the balance between cognitive and affective
brain regions did not, by itself, explain individual differences in
strategy preferences. Activation in another region, dmPFC, pre-
dicted variability in strategic preferences across subjects. We
note that the role of dmPFC in complex decision making remains
relatively unknown. One very recent experiment found increased
activation in this region when subjects faced greater decision-
related conflict (Pochon et al., 2008), as dissociable from the
more commonly reported response conflict (Botvinick et al.,
2001). A similar region of dmPFC was implicated by De Martino
et al. (2006), again when subjects made decisions counter to
their general behavioral tendency (i.e., against typical framing
effects). However, it is important to note that all subjects in their
study exhibited a bias toward using the framing heuristic, while in
the current study subjects varied in their relative preference for
two different strategies. Therefore, a parsimonious explanation
for the function of this region of dmPFC is that it supports
aspects of decision making that are coded in relation to an
underlying strategic tendency, not effects specific to framing.
Further support for this hypothesis is provided by the differential
functional connectivity of the dmPFC to dlPFC and anterior in-
sula for simplifying and compensatory choices, respectively.
These findings are consistent with the interpretation that activa-
tion differences of the dmPFC shape behavior by modulating
choice-related brain regions, with the strength of this modulatory
effect dependent on an individual’s preferred strategy.
We additionally observed a striking relationship between neu-
rometric sensitivity to reward and strategic biases across indi-
viduals. Our initial analyses found that activation of the vSTR
increased when anticipating the outcome of a monetary gamble,
increased further if that gamble was resolved to a gain, but
decreased if that gamble was resolved to a loss. This pattern
of results was consistent with numerous prior studies using
human neuroimaging (Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2000;
Seymour et al., 2007) and primate electrophysiology (Schultz
et al., 1997). However, we additionally observed the result that
the magnitude of the vSTR response was a strong predictor of
individual strategic preferences. Specifically, the sensitivity to
gains and losses in the vSTR is greatest for individuals who
prefer the Pmax choices, consistent with their strategy ofmaximizing their chances of winning. We emphasize that the
gambles were not resolved until after all decisions were made,
so this effect could not be attributed to learning from outcomes.
Although our design does not allow determination of the direc-
tion of causation, these results suggest that an increased sensi-
tivity to reward valence may lead to simple decision rules that
overemphasize the probability of achieving a positive outcome.
Depending on the circumstances, organisms may adopt strat-
egies that emphasize different forms of computation, whether to
obtain additional information (Daw et al., 2006), to improve
models of outcome utility (Montague and Berns, 2002), or to
simplify a complex decision problem. Accordingly, the activation
of a given brain system (e.g., dlPFC) may sometimes lead to
behavior consistent with economic theories of rationality (Sanfey
et al., 2003) and in other circumstances (such as the present
experiment) predict a nonnormative choice consistent with
a simplifying strategy. Our results demonstrate that decision
making reflects an interaction among brain systems coding for
different sorts of computations, with some regions (e.g., aINS
and vmPFC) coding for specific behaviors and others (e.g.,
dmPFC) for preferred strategies.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Weconducted two behavioral experiments (n1 = 128 and n2 = 71) and one fMRI
experiment (n = 23). All subjects were young adults who participated for mone-
tary payment. All subjects gave written informed consent as part of protocols
approved by the Institutional Review Boards of Duke University and Duke
University Medical Center. Details of the procedures for the behavioral exper-
iments can be found in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Twenty-three healthy, neurologically normal young-adult volunteers
(13 female; age range 18–31 years; mean age 24 years) participated in the
fMRI session. No subject was repeated from the behavioral pilot session. All
subjects acclimated to the fMRI environment using a mock MRI scanner and
participated in two short practice runs consisting of six trials each, one inside
and one outside of the fMRI scanner. Three subjects were excluded from some
analyses involving strategy effects due to lack of variability in their response
(two subjects always chose the Pmax option while the third subject never chose
the Pmax option), leaving a total of 20 subjects in the complete analyses of
the decision-making trials. One additional subject was excluded from the
outcome-delivery trials due to a computer error in saving the timing associated
with the trials.
At the outset of the experiment, subjects were provided detailed instructions
about the payment procedures (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures
for details). They were then given a sealed envelope that contained an endow-
ment to offset potential losses; this envelope was sufficiently translucent that
they could see that there was cash inside, even though the quantity could not
be determined. Subjects were also told that there was no deception in the
study and were given an opportunity to question the experimenter about any
procedures before entering the scanner. All subjects expressed that they
understood and believed in the procedures.
Experimental Stimuli
In the fMRI experiment, all subjects were presented with a total of 120 five-
outcome mixed gambles in a completely randomized order. Each of the
gambles comprised two positive outcomes (an extreme outcome of $65 to
$80 and an intermediate outcome of $35 to $50), two negative outcomes (an
extreme outcome of $65 to $85 and an intermediate outcome of $35 to
$50), and a central, reference outcome. The reference outcome was $0 in
half the trials and a negative value ranging from$10 to$25 in the remaining
half of the trials. Probabilities of each of the five outcomes varied between 0.1
and 0.3 in units of 0.05 and always summed to 1 across the five outcomes. WeNeuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 599
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Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
On each trial, subjects could choose between two options for adding money
to one of the outcomes. Adding to the reference outcome increased the overall
chance of winning money compared to losing money and hence was called
the Pmax choice. Alternatively, adding money to an extreme option either
increased the magnitude of the best monetary outcome or decreased the
magnitude of the worst monetary outcome and hence were referred to as
Gmax and Lmin choices, respectively. The amount of money that subjects could
add to the outcomes ranged between $10 and $25 and could differ between
the two outcomes. For trials with negative reference values, one of the options
for adding money always changed the reference option to $0. All outcome
values used in this experiment were multiples of $5.
Expected value relations between the two choices were systematically
manipulated by changing the amount and/or probabilities associated with
each of the options (See Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Only trial
types that placed the two choices in maximal conflict (72 gambles per subject)
were included in the primary imaging analyses; other trials were included in the
model as separate regressors, but not further analyzed. Note that the trials
were counterbalanced for valence of the extreme outcome (i.e., gain or loss)
and for valence of the reference outcome (i.e., neutral or loss).
Experimental Design
Each trial began with the display of a five-outcome gamble for 4 or 6 s
(Figure 1). Subjects were instructed to examine each gamble as it was pre-
sented. Subsequently, subjects were given a choice between two ways of
improving the gamble. The amount that could be added and the resulting
modified outcome values were displayed in red for both choices, to minimize
individual differences resulting from calculation or estimation biases. The
modified gamble remained on the screen for 6 s, whereupon two arrows ap-
peared to specify which button corresponded to which choice. The associa-
tion of the buttons to choice was random. Subjects then pressed the button
corresponding to their choice. Response times were coded as the time
between the appearance of arrows and the button press response (note that
this may not be a true representation of the actual decision times in this
task). Subjects were instructed to arrive at their decision during the 6 s interval
and to press the button corresponding to their choice as soon as the arrows
appeared. The decision and response phases were explicitly separated to
prevent the contamination of decision effects with response-preparation
effects. During the intertrial interval of 4–8 s, a fixation cross was displayed
on the screen. Notice that no feedback was provided at the end of each trial
and hence there was no explicit learning during the decision phase of the task.
Subjects participated in six runs of this decision task, each containing 20
gambles and lasting approximately 6 min. Before those runs, subjects had
the opportunity to practice the experimental task (without reward) in two six-
gamble blocks, one presented outside the MRI scanner and the other pre-
sented within the MRI scanner but prior to collection of the fMRI data. All
stimuli were created using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli,
1997) for MATLAB (Mathworks, inc.) and were presented to the subjects via
MR-compatible LCD goggles. Subjects responded with the index fingers of
each hand via a MR-compatible response box.
After completion of the decision phase, there was a final 6 min run in which
40 of the improved gambles were resolved to an actual monetary gain or loss.
These gambles were selected randomly from the gambles presented during
the decision phase and were presented in modified form based on that
subject’s choices. On each trial, subjects passively viewed one of these
improved gambles on the screen for 2 s (anticipation phase), during which
time random numbers flashed rapidly at the bottom of the screen before stop-
ping at a particular value. A text message corresponding to the amount won or
lost was then displayed for 1 s, followed by an intertrial fixation period of 3–7 s
before the onset of the next trial.
Imaging Methods
We acquired fMRI data on a 4T GE scanner using an inverse-spiral pulse
sequence (Glover and Law, 2001; Guo and Song, 2003) with the following
parameters: TR = 2000 ms; TE = 30 ms; 34 axial slices parallel to the AC-PC
plane, with voxel size of 3.75 3 3.75 3 3.8 mm. High-resolution 3D full-brain600 Neuron 62, 593–602, May 28, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.SPGR anatomical images were acquired and used for normalizing and core-
gistering individual subjects’ data.
Analysis was carried out using FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (version 5.63),
which is part of FMRIB’s Software Library (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) package
(Smith et al., 2004). The following pre-statistics processing steps were applied:
motion correction using MCFLIRT, slice-timing correction, removal of non-
brain voxels using BET, spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of FWHM
8 mm, and high-pass temporal filtering. Registration to high-resolution and
standard images was carried out using FLIRT. All statistical images presented
were thresholded using clusters determined by z > 2.3 and a whole-brain cor-
rected cluster significance threshold of p < 0.05.
We used separate first-level regression models to analyze decision effects
and outcome effects. The decision model comprised two regressors modeling
the magnitude-sensitive compensatory choices (Gmax and Lmin were
combined for additional power) and simplifying Pmax choices in the conflict
conditions, one regressor modeling the responses in the remaining conditions,
one regressor for the initial presentation of the gamble, and one regressor to
model the subject responses. (An additional post-hoc analysis on a subset
of 15 subjects separated the magnitude-sensitive choices according to
whether they were Gmax or Lmin.) Analysis for the outcome phase consisted
of three regressors: one to model the anticipation phase (as subjects were
waiting for the corresponding outcome to be revealed), one for positive
outcomes (gain), and one for negative outcomes (loss). All regressors were
generated by convolving impulses at the onsets of events of interest with
a double-gamma hemodynamic response function. Second-level analysis
for condition and decision effects within each subject was carried out using
a fixed-effects model across runs. Random-effects across-subjects analyses
were carried out using FLAME (stage 1 only). When evaluating the effects of
behavioral traits (transformed into z scores) on brain function, we included
our subjects’ trait measures as additional covariates in the third-level analysis.
Logistic Regression Models of Trial-by-Trial Choices
For obtaining the parameter estimates from individual trials for trial-by-trial
prediction analysis, we used data that were corrected for motion and differ-
ences in slice scan timing but were not smoothed. The data were also trans-
formed into standard space on which the individual ROIs were defined. We
used seven different ROIs for this analysis: the right anterior insula and vmPFC,
which show greater activation for Lmin and Gmax choices respectively; the right
PPC, the right precuneus, and right dlPFC, which show greater activation for
Pmax choices; and finally the dmPFC and rIFG, which track strategic variability
across subjects. All ROIs were defined functionally based on the third-level
activation maps. Activation amplitude was defined as the mean signal change
(in percent) over the 6 s time interval from 4 s to 10 s after the onset of decision
phase (i.e., when subjects are shown the two alternative choices). This time
window was chosen to encompass the maximal signal change of the fMRI
hemodynamic response. A summary measure was obtained for each ROI by
averaging over all constituent voxels.
We then performed a hierarchical logistic regression using SPSS to predict
the choices made by subjects on each individual trial based on strategic pref-
erence (proportion of Pmax choices), brain activation, and interactions between
trait and activation. The complete model included a total of 1440 trials (72 trials
for each of 20 subjects). Parameters were entered into the model in a stepwise
manner, starting with just the behavioral trait measure, then brain activations
from the seven ROIs, and finally an interaction term consisting of activation
in dmPFC multiplied by strategic tendency. All parameters that significantly
improved the model at each stage are summarized in Table 1. The results
were consistent regardless of whether forward selection or backward elimina-
tion was used in the hierarchical regression.
Functional-Connectivity Analyses
We used amodified version of the decision model described above to perform
task-related connectivity analysis. A seed region was defined using activation
in the dmPFC that covaried with the strategic variability across subjects
(Figure 3). For each run for each subject, we then extracted the time series
from this region. A box-car vector was then defined for each condition of
interest, with the ‘‘on’’ period defined from 4 s to 10 s after the onset of the
decision phase for each trial in that condition. These box-car vectors were
Neuron
Strategies and Choices in Risky Decision Makingthen multiplied with the extracted time series to form the connectivity regres-
sors. This allowed us to examine brain connectivity as a function of strategy,
specific to the decision phase. These regressors were then used as covariates
in a separate GLM analysis, which included the original variables of interest,
from the decision model described above (Cohen et al., 2005). Group activa-
tion maps were then obtained in the same way as the traditional regression
analysis. A positive activation for the connectivity regressors indicates that
the region correlates more positively with the seed region during the experi-
mental condition of interest.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures, two
tables, and eight figures and can be found with this article online at http://
www.cell.com/neuron/supplemental/S0896-6273(09)00288-8.
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